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Abstract 
 
In the face of escalating conflicts or atrocities, international organizations (IOs) alongside 
NGOs, often vocalize public condemnation. Researchers have examined NGO shaming, but no 
extant literature has comparatively explored if, how, and why IOs shame. This article fills this 
gap. We conceptualize IO shaming as condemnatory speech acts and distinguish between the 
agent, targets, and actions of shaming. We theorize how compliance and socialization are 
motives that lead IOs to shame. Empirically, we use new data on more than 3,000 instances of 
IO shaming, covering 27 organizations between 1980 and 2015 to examine empirical patterns 
across the three dimensions of agents, targets, and actions. We find that a majority of IOs do 
employ shaming but to varying degrees. Global, general-purpose IOs shame the most and 
regional, task-specific IOs the least. IOs mainly shame states, but there is a rise in the targeting 
of non-state and unnamed actors. While many condemned acts relate to human rights and 
security issues, IOs shame actions across the policy spectrum. These findings indicate that IO 
shaming is driven by compliance and socialization motives and that it is a wider phenomenon 
than previously recognized, suggesting possible avenues for further inquiry. 
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Introduction 
When conflicts escalate or terrorist attacks and other atrocities come to the attention of 
a global public, media headlines are soon flooded with reactions from various political actors. 
Among the actors that vocalize public condemnation in the face of such events are international 
organizations (IOs). IOs, like the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the World 
Health Organization (WHO) or the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), have condemned 
nuclear tests in North Korea1, electoral fraud in Gambia2, the practice of virginity tests3, and 
the economic blockade of Cuba.4 IOs shame to varying degrees and in various contexts. Some 
actions and actors are frequently condemned by IOs but others are rarely publicly decried. 
Certain IOs are vocal and shame frequently, while others are typically silent and scarcely 
criticize. This variation raises several questions: Which IOs tend to shame, who do they shame, 
and what actions are shamed? What can these patterns tell us about IOs’ motives for shaming? 
No extant literature has comparatively explored if, how, and why IOs shame. This 
article fills this gap. We demonstrate that IOs engage in shaming in world politics. Empirically, 
we provide the first systematic comparison of shaming by international organizations. 
Specifically, we examine shaming across 27 IOs from 1980 to 2015. We analyze acts of 
shaming adopted in the policy output (for example, resolutions, decisions or communiques) of 
the highest political decision-making bodies. Our original data cover more than three thousand 
instances of public condemnation, allowing us to better understand the dynamics of IO 
shaming.  
Theoretically, we conceptualize IO shaming as distinguishable from other forms of 
condemnation available to IOs. While IOs have a variety of policy tools that can portray 
                                                     
1  “UN condemns North Korea tests which contribute to nukes.” The Washington Post, 23.3.2017 
2  “African Union condemns Gambian President’s U turn on election results” Lusaka Times, 10.12.2016. 
3  “WHO condemns Virginity Tests” Time, 2.12.2014. 
4  “CARICOM condemns economic blockade of Cuba” Juventud Rebelde, 8.12.2008.  
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criticism, like economic sanctions, membership suspension, or even military action, shaming 
is primarily a communicative, rather than material, tool of public condemnation. Focusing on 
political, non-technical shaming, we distinguish between its three main dimensions: agents—
who shames; targets—who is shamed; and actions—what is shamed. Building on previous 
research, we identify two key motives—compliance and socialization—that help to account for 
why IOs shame. 
We arrive at four core findings about the dynamics of IO shaming. First, we find that 
several IOs employ shaming, albeit to different degrees. In our sample, the UN and OIC are 
the most active agents of shaming, far outstripping other IOs. Second, IOs shame all types of 
actors, but states are the most common target and more recently, we see an increase in shaming 
of non-state actors and unnamed targets. Third, IOs shame acts concerning a variety of issue 
areas. While human rights and security are the most common issues, shaming occurs in other 
domains. Fourth, the empirical patterns suggest that IOs employ shaming in order to both 
induce compliance and to socialize actors. Neither motive on its own fully accounts for the 
variation in shaming across agents, targets and actions that we observe. While we reveal 
patterns of shaming that point to a complex set of motives, future research is necessary to 
determine whether other motives contribute to condemnation and to discern the conditions 
under which each motive is dominant and how they interact.  
Our findings have two general implications. First, our data suggest that shaming is a 
broader phenomenon than conventionally assumed, extending to a variety of agents, targets 
and actions. Extensive research considers NGOs to be agents of shaming (e.g., Ron et al., 2005; 
Hafner-Burton, 2008; Murdie and Davis, 2012; Murdie and Peksen, 2013). This article 
illustrates that IOs can also be shaming agents. When shaming, IOs target not only states, but 
also non-state actors, and even unnamed, non-specified actors. Human rights violations are not 
the only actions condemned, but shaming addresses a wide-range of actions in various policy 
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fields. Second, shaming is one of several policy tools, including sanctions or membership 
suspension, available to IOs to demonstrate criticism. Research on IO performance therefore 
warrants closer attention to how shaming has an impact on IO performance on the one hand 
and on the other hand how shaming compares to other policy tools.  
This article progresses in four steps. We first conceptualize IO shaming and theorize 
how compliance and socialization motivate IOs to shame. Second, we describe the data used 
in our empirical analysis and how we measure shaming by IOs. Third, we present our empirical 
analysis, which relies upon a variety of descriptive statistics and cross tabulations to reveal key 
patterns in IO shaming across agents, targets, and actions. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of our main findings and their implications for research. 
 
 
Shaming by International Organizations  
While a growing literature studies naming and shaming, it largely focuses on the naming and 
shaming of human rights atrocities by NGOs (Ron et al., 2005; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Murdie 
and Davis, 2012; Murdie and Peksen, 2013). In particular, scholars examine what factors 
influence if and how NGOs shame (Ron et al., 2005) as well as what effects shaming has on 
human rights practices (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Murdie and Davis, 2012; Murdie and Peksen, 
2013). Additional research has studied whether human rights shaming affects the distribution 
of foreign aid (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009) and the flow of foreign direct investment (Barry et 
al., 2013).  
At times, this scholarship includes international organizations, meaning formal 
intergovernmental, multilateral and bureaucratic organizational structures established to 
further co-operation among states (Martin and Simmons, 2012). For instance, some studies 
include the UN Commission on Human Rights (now the UN Human Rights Council) alongside 
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NGOs when testing the effects of human rights shaming (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Lebovic and 
Voeten, 2009; Krain, 2012). A few other studies are exceptional. Kelley (2012) studies IO 
shaming in the context of election monitoring and Sharman (2009) looks at “blacklisting” of 
tax havens by IOs. More recently, some scholarship has looked at shaming through IOs’ peer-
review mechanisms (Terman and Voeten, 2017; Carraro et al., forthcoming). Despite these few 
exceptions, research on the politics of shaming have not placed IOs at the center of analysis.  
The dearth of research on shaming by international organizations is surprising for three 
reasons. First, early understandings of shaming envisioned a role for IOs. Notably, Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) illustrated that IOs are crucial to the “boomerang effect” that enables shaming 
to translate into behavioral change. Second, most observers of IOs can easily identify instances 
when IOs have condemned particular behaviors. Third, the potential implications are 
significant. How and why IOs use shaming speaks to broader concerns and questions about the 
mechanism through which IOs attempt to and are able to affect change in international affairs. 
When responding to escalating conflicts or atrocities, IOs typically have several policy 
options, including economic sanctions, military force, and membership suspension. Shaming 
is another policy option available to IOs. We conceive of shaming as a “speech act” (Austin, 
1975) or a formal statement of condemnation promulgated in the policy output of an IO. 
Shaming is therefore distinct from other IO policy tools because it is not a material policy but 
a communicative one. IO statements of condemnation closely approximate what scholars 
define as NGO shaming: condemnation that is primarily a communicative tool (Risse et al., 
1999) or a publicity tactic that shines a spotlight on a bad behavior (Hafner-Burton, 2008).  
For our purposes, shaming by IOs is characterized along three dimensions. The first 
dimension concerns who shames, or which actors are the agents of shaming. We assume that 
agents will differ in terms of whether they are regional or global IOs, meaning states from more 
than two world regions are members. Agents may be general-purpose IOs, having broad 
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mandates covering several policy areas, or they might be task-specific IOs that operate within 
few policy areas (Lenz et al., 2015). Along this dimension, we can determine which IOs tend 
to use shaming and whether they share characteristics that make them more likely to shame. 
The second dimension addresses who is shamed; that is, when IOs shame who is the target? 
We distinguish between member states, non-member states, non-state actors, and unnamed or 
non-specified targets. A focus on the targets of shaming sheds light on the actors that IOs 
condemn and whether certain types of actors are targeted by IOs more than others. The third 
dimension relates to the actions being condemned, or answers the question of what is shamed, 
including anything from economic, trade, and development policies to human rights violations 
and military actions. Differentiating the actions shamed allows us to identify variation in the 
behaviors that are condemned. There may be other dimensions to shaming, such as linguistic 
markers or how shaming is communicated. We set these aside because they do not provide 
analytical leverage over the question of motives on the basis of our data. With the dimensions 
of agent, target, and action, however, we are able to generate clear observable implications to 
discern motives. 
 
Why Shame? 
Why do IOs shame? Previous research in international relations portrays condemnation, 
including sanctions and shaming, as policy that is aimed at either inducing compliance or 
socializing. For example, Wallensteen and Grusell (2012: 207) approach UN “smart sanctions” 
as policy that is pursued “to achieve member state compliance.” Sharman (2009: 594) describes 
“blacklisting” by IOs as a “new compliance tool.” Other literature suggests that condemnation 
is better viewed as an “instrument of socialization” (Audie, 1996) which “helps to clarify norms 
and achieve conformity” (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 149). Against this backdrop, we consider how 
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these two motivations—compliance and socialization—account for the dynamics of IO 
shaming.  
First, IOs may shame actors to cause reputational damage that will compel them to 
comply with commitments. Previous research shows that reputation can have a bearing on an 
actor’s inclination to comply with obligations because noncompliance can generate social costs 
(Simmons, 2000; Tomz, 2007b; Brewster, 2009). From this perspective, we assume that IOs, 
either through their national representatives or internal bureaucrats, recognize that political 
actors are concerned with their reputation and that noncompliance can cause damage to an 
actor’s social status, especially if others are aware of failures to comply.  
Shaming equates to calling out non-compliers, harming their reputation. IOs will 
therefore use shaming with the expectation that it has reputational costs that actors want to 
avoid. Shaming is likely to affect an actor’s reputation through two paths. It may affect one’s 
reputation vis-a-vis international audiences. Among other things, a decline in international 
social status can put future possibilities for cooperation at risk. The status of actors’ reputation 
today can cause others to doubt the credibility of their commitments (Crescenzi et al., 2012). 
Concerns for future cooperation thus can incentivize compliance in order to reduce 
international audience costs. Also, shaming can raise domestic audience costs. Citizens care 
about their state’s international reputation (Tomz, 2007a) and acts of condemnation on the 
international stage can embolden domestic opposition, and therefore incentivize changes in 
behavior. For these reasons, IOs may see shaming as a device for improving compliance by 
striking at a non-complier’s reputation among international and domestic audiences. 
Generally, if noncompliance motivates IOs to condemn publically, we would expect to 
observe a few core patterns in shaming by IOs. IOs with broad mandates (i.e., general-purpose 
IOs) and larger memberships (i.e., global IOs) will shame more often than those with narrow 
mandates (i.e., task-specific IOs) and fewer member states (i.e., regional IOs). The former set 
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of IOs tend to have a larger set of commitments and actors with obligations, and therefore a 
greater likelihood of noncompliance subject to possible shaming. Also, we would expect the 
primary targets of shaming to be member states, seeing as these are the actors who typically 
make binding obligations within the purview of an IO. We would also expect shaming for 
compliance purposes to name the transgressors, as naming is important for inflicting 
reputational damage. In terms of actions, we would expect IOs to express condemnation of 
actions that clearly violate international obligations, perhaps even calling the actions failures 
to comply or violations, including in technical areas or issues relating to low politics (e.g., 
environment, crime, culture). 
Second, IOs may use shaming to socialize actors. A wide-range of research argues that 
IOs have social power (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) and contribute to the socialization of 
political actors in world politics (Checkel, 2005; Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Greenhill, 
2010).  According to this view, socialization is a process of social learning, “inducting actors 
into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel, 2005: 804). It occurs primarily 
through the use of moral discourses and acts of communication, argumentation, and persuasion 
(Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 13).  
Recognizing their social influence, IOs may use shaming as a socialization device. 
Shaming socializes by framing and publicizing information about actions, couched in a moral 
discourse to signal which behaviors are or are not socially appropriate (Keck and Sikkink, 
1998; Risse et al., 1999; Risse, 2000). While expressing validity claims about a norm, shaming 
also conveys identity-related arguments (Katzenstein, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). It 
denounces norm-violators and makes them feel shame or embarrassment because it 
communicates how their behavior fails to conform to standards of appropriateness for an 
identity they aspire to have. Simultaneously, shaming leads those doing the shaming to identify 
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more strongly with each other and enhance their own collective understanding. In other words, 
shaming “constructs categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 15).  
Socialization as a motivation for IO shaming leads to a few observable implications. 
IOs with strong collective identities most likely will shame for socialization purposes. This is 
because socialization promotes as well as reflects collective identities (Wendt, 1994; Risse and 
Sikkink, 1999). Regional IOs typically are associated with strong collective identities (Hemmer 
and Katzenstein, 2002) and regional cooperation constructs shared identity (Acharya, 2001). 
Second, the targets of shaming are likely to be diverse. While compliance motives will lead to 
a focus on shaming member states, we would expect socialization to go beyond members states. 
In addition to member states, socialization will target non-members, non-state actors, such as 
terrorists, foreign fighters, and armed groups and sometimes even unnamed, non-specified 
actors (for example, the UN often condemns all violence against women, without specifying 
any particular actor). Shaming of these actors occurs to shame norm violators and to reaffirm 
a community’s identity. Thus, statehood or naming is less pivotal than when shaming for 
compliance purposes. Similarly, socialization motives would tend to be directed toward 
“constitutive norms”—rules that define the identity of an actor—as opposed to “regulative” 
norms – which specify standards of behavior (Katzenstein, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998).  We assume that constitutive norms tend to be concentrated in the policy areas typically 
associated with high politics (e.g., security, human rights, etc.) because they more often speak 
to issues of existential importance for states and other actors, as opposed to issues such as 
education, environment or industry.   
From our perspective, international organizations, especially when examined through 
their principal intergovernmental decision-making bodies, involve multiple interests. Thus, 
compliance and socialization are likely to both contribute to IO shaming. They need not be 
mutually exclusive. This is not to say that one motive cannot dominate in discrete instances. 
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Indeed, one IO may use shaming predominately for compliance reasons while another does so 
in order to socialize, or an IO’s motives may vary over time and instances. Also, IOs may have 
additional motives for issuing public condemnation. For example, IOs may shame in order to 
self-legitimize.5 We focus on compliance and socialization because these motives are 
generalizable: all IOs confront dilemmas of compliance and socialization. Also, existing 
research suggests that shaming serves these purposes. There is less consensus on shaming as it 
relates to, for example, self-legitimation. Last, as we show, compliance and socialization speak 
to a large share of shaming. 
 
 
Data  
We operationalize IO shaming as publicly adopted decisions by principal interstate decision-
making bodies that condemn undesirable activities by states and other actors. We select a 
sample of 27 IOs and gather available data in the period from 1980 to 2015, as reported in 
Table 1. This sample is based on a stratified random sample from a list of 182 IOs drawn from 
the Correlates of War IGO (COW-IGO) Dataset (Pevehouse et al., 2004), corrected for 
perceived political importance and fit with parallel datasets (Tallberg et al., 2014; Hooghe et 
al., 2017). It provides a suitable starting point for a comparative analysis of IO shaming 
practices. First, it has a wide geographic scope, including the paramount global organization, 
the UN, and key regional organizations in all major world regions. The geographical 
distribution across IOs of different types is broadly reflective of that of the global population.  
Second, it includes both general-purpose IOs with broad policy agendas, such as the AU, and 
task-specific IOs that focus on a narrow set of issues, such as EFTA. Third, the sample captures 
                                                     
5 We do not include this motivation in our analysis because we do not have comparative data on IO legitimacy 
deficits, even though it may be among IOs’ motives to shame. 
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variation in terms of membership characteristics, identities, and institutional rules to enable a 
more representative sample of the universe of IOs.   
IOs often contain a multitude of organizational bodies and institutional arrangements, 
and any of these bodies could shame, from statements by formal representatives to the reports 
of technical working bodies. We focus on the principal interstate decision-making bodies, such 
as the Assembly of the AU and the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In the international realm, these bodies typically provide the 
strategic direction of an organization, set the agenda for subsidiary organs, and often hold 
responsibility for compliance monitoring, both with regard to specific policy legislation and to 
foundational norms and statutes. While we recognize that several of these decision-making 
bodies have subsidiary organs that engage in shaming of their own,6 they provide the 
appropriate place to study the type of political, non-technical shaming that is our primary 
interest.7 The principal decision-making body also reflects, more than any other body, the 
collective will of the membership. Another reason to focus on interstate decision-making 
bodies is that they are relatively comparable. As argued by Blake and Payton (2015: 388), 
because these bodies are nearly universal across IOs, they provide “a point of comparison 
across IGOs and increase the validity of the data collected because we can be confident that we 
are collecting data on IGO organs that perform largely similar roles within their institutions.”  
The identification of principal decision-making bodies was made on the basis of 
provisions in the founding treaty of each respective IO. In cases where more than one body 
exists at the same level – typically multiple ministerial councils for different issue areas – we 
code all bodies as one. For the UN, we select the General Assembly, because in comparison 
                                                     
6 For example, the UN General Assembly has a subsidiary organ, the UN Human Rights Council, which 
engages in shaming. The ILO General Conference has several technical subsidiary organs that shame.  
7 Technical shaming, for example, includes shaming through peer review mechanisms.  
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with the Security Council, it has a more representative membership, a larger output, and covers 
a wider range of policy issues, encapsulating the multi-issue nature of the organization.8 
For each IO in our sample, we gathered the full text of all of the principal forms of its 
policy output, such as all resolutions and decisions. We sourced the data from official electronic 
archives, supplemented where necessary with direct contacts to secretariats, repository 
libraries, and secondary literature. The observation period spans from 1980 to 2015, 
sufficiently long to reveal long-term trends from the Cold War era until today. Our data contain 
some missing values for the most recent years, mainly because the data have not yet been 
released. In total, the dataset contains some twenty thousand policy acts.  
To measure shaming, we identify all instances where IOs’ policy output publicly 
reproaches an actor for some undesired action. We select these provisions or clauses based on 
a short dictionary of condemnatory operative terms conventionally used to signal reproach in 
international policy-making and diplomacy.9 The two key operative terms are “condemns” and 
“deplores,” which are standard formulations in international law (Szasz, 2002; Chesterman et 
al., 2008), employed by a wide range of IOs, and have remained in consistent usage since at 
least the creation of the United Nations in 1945 (Castaneda, 1969). This operationalization 
generalizes an approach adopted in studies of human rights shaming (for example, Hafner-
Burton, 2008; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009), which have similarly relied on condemnation 
clauses, and it is in line with scholarship on international law, which recognizes that shaming 
is inherent to the usage of “condemns” in operative paragraphs (Koremenos, 2016: 255). By 
requiring that a clause include an explicit condemnation, this operationalization provides a 
                                                     
8 We also gathered shaming data on the UNSC, see footnote 10.  
9 Operative terms included are “condemns,” “deplores” and “denounces,” separately or with adverbial 
modifiers, e.g., “strongly condemns” or “emphatically denounces.” From the sample of 27 IOs, two 
organizations (AMU and CAN) did not provide official policies in English. We translated our search terms into 
French (“condemner” and “dénoncer”) and Spanish (“condenar” and “deplorer”) where a corresponding 
unambiguous word exists in that language. 
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tough criterion, which facilitates coding reliability and leaves little room for subjective 
interpretation.  
For each shaming attempt, we categorize the identity of the shaming agent, the target 
being shamed, and the action for which it is being shamed. The shaming agent is the IO 
adopting the decision that contains a condemnation clause. Among targets, we identify IO 
member states based on Correlates of War IO data (Pevehouse et al., 2004). Non-state actors 
include civil society organization, private enterprises, insurgents, terrorist groups, and private 
individuals. In cases where shaming targeted actors attempting coup d’états, we coded the actor 
as a member state if the coup succeeded (and power was transferred to the coup-makers) but 
as a non-state actor if the coup failed. Non-specified targets cover instances where shaming is 
directed against an activity or phenomenon in general, without attributing culpability (at least 
not in clear terms) to a specific target. We specify action based on a list of global governance 
topic codes previously developed (for details see Lundgren et al., 2018). The list covers 18 
major policy topics, such as human rights and security, and more than a hundred more specific 
sub-topics.  
  
 
Empirical analysis: IO shaming across agents, targets, and acts 
The aim of our empirical analysis is to identify broad patterns in IO shaming across agents, 
targets, and acts. We begin by investigating which IOs shame and which do not, and how 
patterns have changed over time. We then turn to an examination of the targets of IO shaming 
and then the actions that IOs shame. Throughout, we examine and discuss whether and how 
the evidence provides insights into the underlying motives.   
 
Agents: who shames? 
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While there exist IOs that do not engage in shaming (including EFTA, NAFTA, and the 
SCO), a wide range of IOs across all geographic regions do employ shaming as a strategy. Our 
data demonstrate that 20 out of the 27 IOs in our sample have engaged in shaming since 1980 
(Table 1).  However, there is a significant degree of variation with regard to the frequency (in 
terms of the yearly occurrences) and overall amount of shaming. One group of IOs infrequently 
shame (e.g., APEC and OSCE), one group regularly employs shaming but at low or medium 
levels (e.g., NATO and AU), and a final group that employs shaming commonly and 
consistently. This latter group consists of two IOs, the UN and the OIC, which together 
generate the lion’s share of the shaming in our sample and have multiple instance of shaming 
in most years. The UN represents 55.4 percent and the OIC 30.8 percent of IO shaming, leaving 
the remaining 18 IOs to account for only 13.8 percent.10  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Figures 1 and 2 depict temporal patterns in shaming by IOs. An examination of these 
patterns suggests that the OIC engages in shaming at a relatively stable rate: the proportion of 
condemnations in relation to overall output of policy acts is practically constant across time, at 
an average rate of four condemnations per five resolutions (Figure 1). In comparison, shaming 
by the UN General Assembly displays temporal variation. It occurs with high frequency in the 
1980s, approximately one condemnation per resolution, but drops distinctly around the end of 
the Cold War to about one condemnation per four resolutions. Among the other IOs, the 
                                                     
10 We record 514 instances of shaming by the UN Security Council between 1980 and 2015. If the UN Security 
replaces the General Assembly in our sample, the UN’s share of all shamings is 27.3 percent. Thus, if we were 
to substitute the UNSC for the UNGA, we would record somewhat fewer instances of shaming for the UN, but 
most importantly, most across-IO patterns would remain unchanged. For example, similar to the UNGA, we 
find no distinct trend in UNSC shaming before and after the Cold War. Even though the UNSC was politically 
deadlocked on operational activities during the Cold War, it was less so when expressing public condemnation. 
Shaming may have even been a replacement for more extensive forms of action, such as sanctions or 
intervention.  
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African Union has a jagged temporal pattern, with high levels in the 1980s and the 2010s, 
whereas shaming by NATO is relatively constant across time (Figure 2). Some IOs used 
condemnation mostly during the 1980s (CARICOM and WHO), whereas the OAS and the 
Council of Europe are the only IOs for which we find a sharp increase in shaming around 2000. 
Figures 1 and 2 also reveal that the frequency of shaming acts corresponds to the overall policy-
making activity of IOs in some cases (e.g., OIC, ASEAN, OAU/AU after 1985), but not for all 
(e.g., UN, OAS). 
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
In sum, the majority of IOs engage in shaming, but some do not, and there is considerable 
variation in the scope of shaming across IOs. One pattern that emerges from the data is that 
global IOs shame more than regional IOs and general-purpose more than task-specific IOs 
(Table 2). These factors appear to interact, so that global general-purpose IOs shame far more 
than regional task-specific IOs. In fact, Table 2 reveals that global, general purpose IOs account 
for 88% of all instances of shaming that we observe. This pattern most likely relates to IOs 
motivations to address noncompliance. Given their broader mandates and larger memberships, 
these IOs typically have more commitments to monitor and more states with obligations that 
are potentially subject to shaming. At the same time, the data implies that socialization also 
motivates shaming. We observe that some regional IOs that are often attributed with a strong 
collective identity (such as ASEAN and CARICOM) are among the group with low to medium 
amounts of shaming (Table 1). This suggests that IOs with a strong internal identity may be 
more prone to shaming. Also, two of the IOs that most frequently rely on shaming, NATO and 
the OIC (for example, both have shaming acts in most years, see Figure 1 and 2), both employ 
shaming mainly against outside targets and commonly to demarcate against perceived external 
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enemies. This suggests that in addition to compliance concerns, regional IOs rely on shaming 
for socialization.11 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Targets: who is shamed? 
Our second dimension of shaming concerns the targets of condemnation. Our data 
suggest that different types of actors are subject to IO condemnation: states (67%), non-state 
actors (14%), and unnamed, non-specified targets (19%). With a few exceptions, however, IOs 
largely refrain from shaming other IOs. As illustrated in Figure 3, target selection varies 
considerably both across IOs and across time. Both the UN and the OIC predominantly shame 
states, but the UN only shames member states (likely a function of its near universal 
membership) whereas the OIC frequently targets non-member states, at a rate not matched by 
any other IO in the sample. In fact, there are only a handful of cases where the OIC shames its 
own member states; the vast majority of its shaming is directed towards non-members, such as 
Israel. Among the other IOs, shaming is distributed more evenly across the different targets, 
with non-state actors and non-member states providing the top two categories.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Figure 3 also demonstrates clear temporal shifts in the selection of principal targets. 
One pattern is the increased targeting of non-state actors – predominantly terrorist and rebel 
groups – which is observed for nearly all IOs in the sample. For example, in the 1980s, shaming 
                                                     
11 Despite being a global IO with 57 members across four continents, the OIC is an IO with a strong collective 
identity; as a global actor it aims to represent and be a collective voice for the Muslim world (Kayaoglu, 2015).  
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in the UN General Assembly mainly targeted member states, with very few condemnations of 
non-state actors and other targets. Over time, however, the amount of shaming targeting non-
state actors has increased to nearly a quarter of all UN General Assembly condemnations, 
making it as common a target as member states. The OIC displays a similar development, with 
a consistent growth in the share of shaming that target non-state actors, to reach nearly a quarter 
of all cases in the 2010-2015 period.  
A parallel temporal pattern is the increased condemnation of unnamed or non-specified 
targets; in other words, general shaming that does not specify culpability for a given act. These 
cases often relate to condemnations of problems that are widespread, systematic, and operating 
at the level of groups or individuals, such as discrimination, racism, or certain human rights 
violations. But they may also relate to specific situations where an actor is not identified for 
strategic reasons. This pattern is observable among most IOs, but particularly striking in the 
case of the UN, where the non-specified target category grew from 12 percent in the 1980s to 
62 percent of all condemnations in recent years. The OIC is a counter example, only rarely 
issuing condemnations without an identified target.     
 Table 3 exhibits the most common targets. While some actors are frequently targeted, 
variation in the overall distribution of targets is striking. The named targets comprise around 
50 different countries and a high number of diverse non-state actors, including al-Qaeda, Hindu 
extremists, and Pope Benedict XVI. It includes states with very different characteristics, from 
small and weak states such as Fiji and Madagascar to great powers, including the United States, 
the former Soviet Union, Japan, France and even IOs, such as the European Union. Two 
countries, Israel and South Africa, attract a very high number of IO condemnations and together 
represent a large proportion of the IO shaming that we identify. Some targets are “owned” by 
a particular IO, that is, a single IO represents all or most of the shaming of this particular target. 
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These include India (condemned almost exclusively by the OIC)12 and Iraq (condemned mainly 
by the UN). Others are subject to more general condemnation, drawing criticism from several 
IOs at the same time. This is seen most clearly in the case of apartheid South Africa and the 
increasing condemnation of terrorism since the early 2000s.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
These empirical patterns reflect compliance and socialization motives. Compliance motives 
would lead us to expect IOs to target member states, as these are the actors who typically make 
binding commitments in world politics. A large share of shaming before 1990 reflects a 
compliance logic dominated shaming activities of IOs. However, the increased targeting of 
non-members and non-state actors, as well as unspecified actors suggests that socialization has 
evolved to be a strong motivation for why IO shaming.   
 
Actions: what is shamed? 
The third dimension of shaming concerns the actions or events that are subject to IO shaming. 
Table 4 summarizes the distribution across different policy issues areas, revealing that a wide 
variety of issues are targeted in IO shaming. Overall, shamed events cover fourteen out of our 
sixteen policy categories, with security and human rights each receiving about a third of the 
shaming, while the remaining third is distributed across the other twelve categories.13 The 
pattern that emerges is that a handful of policy issues dominate and that about half of the policy 
issues are of marginal importance, from a shaming perspective, for the IOs in our sample.  
 
                                                     
12 For a discussion of the OIC’s relationship with and condemnation of India, see Kayaoglu (2015: 49-52).  
13 Two policy areas were never subject to shaming: energy/transport and agriculture/fisheries/commodities. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
In Figure 4, we plot the annual frequency of shaming across the eight most common 
issue areas. This allows us to examine issue area variation over time. We observe that shaming 
in the field of human rights has continued to climb, in a jagged pattern, throughout the observed 
period. In contrast, shaming in the field of international affairs (which includes international 
law and questions of decolonization) has decreased in a more or less linear trend since the 
1980s. For security and defense, we observe a V-shaped trend, with frequent shaming in the 
1980s, a dip in the 1990s, and a growing trend in the last 15 years, mainly reflecting the 
increased shaming of non-state actors in civil war and terrorism.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
The concentration of shaming to two issue areas marked primarily by constitutive norms – 
human rights and security – rather than regulative norms reinforces the impression that 
socialization is an important motive behind IO shaming.14 Reflecting this tendency, the 
distribution of shaming within the larger human rights field (Table 5) reveals that the most 
common form of human rights shaming among the IOs in our sample, after general 
condemnation of human rights violations, concerns discrimination and violence on grounds of 
ethnicity, race and religion. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, perhaps reflecting its 
denominational membership criteria, represents a large share of public condemnations in this 
category.15 Examples of the OIC’s extensive reliance on public rebuke include the 
                                                     
14 Some human rights and security shaming does relate to binding obligations, however, this largely depends on 
whether the target has ratified relevant treaties or is bound by other forms international legal obligations (e.g., 
customary law).  
15 The protection of Muslim minority communities is one of the OIC’s most prominent policy goals (Kayaoglu 
2015).  
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condemnation of “the destruction of the historic Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India, by Hindu 
extremists” or the 2007 resolution that “condemns strongly the publication of offensive 
caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).”16 These would appear to be instances of shaming 
that are primarily driven by a willingness to underline principles (and their material expression) 
that are shared internally, among the IO’s members. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
This does not mean that all instances of human rights shaming seek to promote socialization. 
There are clear instances when IO shaming appears motivated by compliance motives. 
Shaming of South Africa’s policy of apartheid, widespread among many IOs during the 1980s, 
provides examples of compliance-oriented shaming in the field of human rights. While 
shaming of apartheid may be understood to reinforce foundational principles relating to human 
dignity and worth, it is probably best understood as attempts to impose costs on the South 
African regime in an effort to make it change its behavior. Similarly, shaming of torture and 
cruel punishment (8.1 percent of human rights shaming) also point to a compliance-oriented 
logic, as does shaming focusing on the rights of specific groups, such as LGBT rights or 
women’s rights.  
 Compliance-oriented motivations are found also in the shaming that target activities 
other than human rights. A significant body of shaming (16 percent) targets international 
affairs. Typically, this type of condemnation targets states’ failure to comply with international 
law. In 1992, for example, the UN agreed to a resolution that “condemns the continued and 
persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention.”17  Since this condemnation is clearly 
                                                     
16 OIC Resolution 2.34 (2007); OIC Resolution 34.34 (2007) 
17 UN General Assembly Resolution 47/70 (1992) 
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linked to the identification of a principle that is viewed as violated (here, the Geneva 
Convention), a compliance motive seems more likely. Another example in this sub-area where 
shaming is employed as an instrument to further a clearly identified political goal can be found 
in a 2012 OIC resolution that “condemns the French occupation on the Said Island and calls 
upon France to encourage dialogue among the Comoros Union for an effective return of 
Mayotte and to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Comoros.”18   
 Overall, these patterns speak to the relevance of compliance and socialization motives. 
IOs shame actions that are forbidden by binding obligations, sometimes even explicitly stating 
the action is a violation of an obligation or a failure to comply. At the same time, some shaming 
focuses on actions that are not clearly prohibited by binding obligations and rather speak to 
constitutive norms. The wide range of actions that have been socially sanctioned by IOs cannot 
be fully accounted for by socialization or compliance motives alone. Rather, the evidence 
suggests that both are crucial motives behind shaming.   
 
 
Conclusion  
We provide the first systematic, comparative analysis of shaming by IOs based on a 
representative sample. Our analysis reveals important patterns of shaming across agents, 
targets, and actions. First, while there are IOs that do not engage in shaming, a wide range of 
different IOs do employ public shaming – albeit to varying degrees. The most active agents of 
shaming are IOs with larger memberships and broad mandates, such as the UN and the OIC, 
whereas the least active are smaller IOs with task-specific mandates, such as NAFTA or EFTA. 
Second, all types of actors are subject to IO condemnation. IOs most often shame states, and 
IOs shame one another very infrequently. An important finding is that IOs are increasingly 
                                                     
18 OIC Resolution 8.39 (2012) 
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shaming non-state actors and shaming acts without clearly identifying a target. Third, IOs 
shame acts across the policy spectrum, but security and human rights violations are those that 
are most often condemned. Overall, we find that the agents, targets, and actions of IO shaming 
is dynamic. In particular, we observe two evolving dynamics that merit further research: 
shaming without naming and shaming of non-state actors, both of which have increased 
significantly over time. 
  These findings suggest that both compliance and socialization motivations lie at the 
heart of shaming by IOs.  Some evidence corresponds with what we would expect to see if IOs 
employed shaming in order to address noncompliance. We observe general-purpose IOs and 
global IOs, which typically have larger memberships, are among the most frequent agents of 
shaming. We also find that shaming largely targets member states and focuses on actions that 
are subject to binding obligations. At the same time, there is strong evidence that points to 
socialization. We see that IOs with strong collective identities, based on shared religious beliefs 
or geographic location, are also important shaming agents. Moreover, we find that IOs shame 
a whole host of actors, including non-member states and non-state actors, and IOs also shame 
actions which are not violations of explicit commitments, and in issues areas that would tend 
to speak to constitutive norms, like human rights and security.  
While our data suggest that IO shaming reflects both compliance and socialization 
motives, further research is necessary to determine whether these motives are exhaustive. We 
have earlier suggested that self-legitimation may encourage some IOs to employ public 
condemnation. Also, we have not explored the conditions under which each motivation 
dominates or how the two motives interact. For example, are IO memberships with 
heterogeneous preferences less inclined to use shaming for socialization purposes? Do IOs with 
majority voting rules use shaming as a compliance tool to a greater extent than IOs with 
unanimity voting?  
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By providing a comparative analysis of IO shaming, this article has three broader 
implications for future research. First, more data is necessary to have a full picture of IO 
shaming. We have looked at a selection of IOs. Even though our sample is representative of 
the general population, many IOs are not included. We are therefore cautious in drawing 
conclusions but optimistic that IO shaming is a significant phenomenon worthy of closer 
examination, both across a broader array of IOs and through focused studies on single IOs.  
Second, our analysis highlights that shaming extends to a variety of agents, targets and 
actions that scholarship has not yet examined. Our examination shows that shaming is a larger 
phenomenon than previously believed and our findings suggest new avenues of research lie 
with exploring the full range of agents, targets and actions that are shamed in world politics. 
For example, we find that “shaming without naming” is fairly widespread and has become 
more frequent over time. What accounts for “shaming without naming”? Another dynamic is 
the increased targeting of non-state actors. Why do we observe this pattern and how can we 
understand it?  
Third, this article views shaming as one of several policy tools available to IOs. Having 
observed a significant amount of IO shaming and its variation, we conclude that research on 
IO performance would benefit from greater attention to shaming. Shaming seems to be a 
particularly important policy tool for some IOs (such as the OIC and UN). How do IOs select 
among policy tools and why do IOs, such as the OIC, choose shaming as opposed to other 
policies? Also, how does shaming compare to the other policy tools? Is shaming more effective 
than sanctioning, and are IOs that use shaming better able to achieve their goals? This article 
thus highlights a need for more inquiry into such questions.  
 24 
Tables and Figures  
 
 
Table 1: Total IO shaming cases, 1980-2015 
 
IO 
 
IO Body 
Data  
since 
Shaming 
 cases 
Average 
 membership 
 size 
UN United Nations General Assembly 1980 1,700 178 
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1980 944 50 
OAS Organization of American States General Assembly 1980 72 34 
OAU/AU African Union Assembly of the African Union 1980 63 50 
CoE Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1980 54 35 
CommonW Commonwealth Secretariat Heads of Government Meeting* 1980 53 49 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization North Atlantic Council 1980 39 20 
WHO World Health Organization World Health Assembly 1980 35 176 
CARICOM Caribbean Community Ministerial Councils 1980 21 13 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit 1980 18 8 
SADC Southern African Development Community Heads of State and Government 1980 15 12 
UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization General Conference 1980 13 173 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Council / FSC 1994 8 54 
PIF Pacific Islands Forum Heads of State and Government 1980 6 11 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’meeting 1989 5 18 
CAN Andean Community Commission 1980 2 4 
IWC International Whaling Commission Commission 1980 2 54 
AMU Arab Maghreb Union Presidential Council 1989 1 5 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization Council 1980 1 166 
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ILO International Labour Organization General Conference 1980 1 164 
EFTA European Free Trade Association Ministerial meeting 1980 0 5 
ICC International Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties 2002 0 105 
NAFO Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization Fisheries Commission 1980 0 14 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement Free Trade Commission 1997 0 3 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Council 1980 0 28 
SCO Shanghai Co-operation Organization Council of Heads of Member States 1996 0 6 
WTO World Trade Organization General Council 1995 0 122 
* The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group is included after it was established in 1995. 
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Table 2: IO shaming by IO mandate and geographic scope, 1980-2015 
 
 Global Regional Total 
Task specific  
 
109 
(APEC,  
NATO, UNESCO, 
IWC, ILO, WHO, 
WTO, ICC, FAO) 
62 
(OSCE, EFTA, 
NAFTA, CoE, 
NAFO) 
 171 
General purpose  
 
2,697 
(UN, OIC,  
Commonwealth) 
198 
(AU, SADC, PIF, 
ASEAN, SCO, AMU, 
OAS, CARICOM, 
CAN) 
 2,895 
Total  2,806 260  3,066 
 
Note: Our definition of global IOs includes IOs with member states from more than two world regions 
(e.g. OIC: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America). The classification of general purpose / task-specific 
IOs is taken from Lenz et al. (2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Most frequent targets of IO condemnation  
 
Target Type N Shamed by 
Israel Country 899 OIC (52%), UN (41%), WHO (4%) 
South Africa Country 503 UN (88%), OIC (6%), AU (2%) 
Terrorists NSA 148 UN (41%), OIC (21%), NATO (13%)  
United States Country 43 OIC (81%), UN (7%), AU (5%), CoE (5%) 
Serbia  Country 40 UN (85%), OIC (8%), NATO (5%) 
India Country 39 OIC (98%), OAS (2%) 
“Non-islamic countries” Country 29 OIC (100%) 
Hindu extremists NSA 25 OIC (100%) 
Iraq Country 19 UN (90%), CoE (10%) 
France Country 17 OIC (88%), PIF (12%) 
Taliban NSA 14 UN (100%) 
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Table 4: IO shaming by shamed action 
 
Policy subfield N Percent 
Human rights 1,032 33.6 
Security and defence 983 32.0 
International affairs 492 16.0 
Culture and education 225 7.3 
Law and crime 144 4.7 
Environment 75 2.4 
Trade and industry 48 1.6 
Economic development 33 1.1 
Other 34 1.1 
Total 3,066 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: IO condemnation in the field of human rights 
Policy subfield N Percent 
General human rights 223 21.6 
Ethnic minorities and racial issues 191 18.5 
Religious discrimination 187 18.1 
War crimes, crimes against humanity 117 11.3 
Torture and cruel punishments 84 8.1 
Refugees 74 7.2 
Political rights 63 2.9 
Children's rights 34 3.3 
Gender equality and gender-based violence 22 2.1 
Indigenous peoples 15 1.5 
LGBT rights 10 1.0 
Women's rights 9 0.8 
Access to information 2 0.2 
Other  1 0.1 
Total 1,032 100 
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Figure 1: OIC and UN condemnation 1980-2015, by organization 
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Figure 2: IO condemnation 1980-2015, by organization 
 
Note: Data on the number of adopted policies is based on the aggregated sum of different policy 
instruments (see Sommerer, Tallberg and Squatrito 2018) and z-standardized for each IO. Data is 
missing for APEC and NATO. 
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Figure 3: IO condemnation by target, 1980-2015 
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Figure 4: IO condemnation 1980-2015, by issue areas 
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